

2-35978

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002100020005-0

TOP SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATIONDate Rec'd: 20 Nov 52  
Auth CS, USAF

25X1A

## \*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File\*

TAB "A"

20 Nov 52

75780

D/I USAF PROPOSED CHANGES TO NIE-64 (Part I) EXTENDED TO MID-1954 (All references are to the published NIE)

1. Ref. page 2, para 10. Suggest this paragraph be deleted because intelligence cannot support the projection of a Communist capability, or lack of capability, to overthrow any non-Communist government during the period to mid-1954. (Subsequent paragraphs to be renumbered in accordance with this deletion.)
2. Ref. page 4, para 24. Change to read: We estimate that the Bloc armed forces by mid-1954 <sup>3</sup> will probably have:
 

\* \* \* \*

b. An authorized strength of about 26,700 ~~over-25,000~~ aircraft, including about 13,000 ~~10,150~~ jet fighters, 1250 ~~1200~~ medium piston bombers, and possibly a few jet medium bombers. <sup>3</sup> (Footnote to remain as is)
3. Ref. page 4, para 28, last sentence: Revise to read: We estimate that by mid-1954 ~~1953~~ there will not be a considerable increase in the numerical strength of the air defense forces will-not-change, although the effectiveness of the air defenses will improve through re-equipment and training.
4. Ref. page 5, para 36: Revise to read: Since the beginning of the Korean war, the Communist Air Force in China, which is believed to be made up of Chinese Communist, North Korean, and Soviet elements, has been built to an impressive size. The jet fighter units in the Korea-Manchuria-North China area are believed to be progressively improving. With the introduction by

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

- ☒ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA  
 interest that must remain  
 classified at

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002100020005-0

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest  
 Date 10/23/91 Reviewer 6314

Page 5 of 40 copies  
 12A002100020005-0

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~capabilities of this air force will increase. However, the capabilities of the CAF . . . in Korea and adjacent waters. We believe the CAF in China will continue to expand gradually during the period of this estimate but will remain entirely dependent upon the USSR for aircraft and equipment, spare parts, and technical supervision, and almost entirely dependent upon the USSR for aviation fuels and lubricants. Unless some type . . . extremely limited. Redeployment from the Manchuria . . . against Taiwan and Southeast Asia.~~

5. Ref. page 6, para 47: Suggest revising to read: We believe that Bloc political warfare capabilities in the Middle East ~~and Africa~~ will remain comparatively low throughout the period of this estimate, except in Iran. In Africa, it may be expected that Communist political efforts will be proportionately increased in those regions where native unrest constitutes a continuing problem for Western security - Union of South Africa, Tunisia, French Morocco and Kenya. The Bloc has taken little positive action thus far in these this areas, and most of the existing Communist Parties have been forced underground. However, continued deterioration of the Western position would increase the vulnerability of the area to Bloc political warfare.
6. Ref. page 7, para 49, third sentence. Suggest revising to read: We believe that there is very little likelihood that the Indian Communists can make sufficient progress within the period of this estimate seriously to contest the dominant position of the Congress Party.
7. Ref. page 7, para 50, last sentence. Revise to read: However, at present, the Party lacks the capability for seizing control of the government during

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

~~the period of this estimate, and almost certainly will be~~ is unable significantly to impair Japanese cooperation with the West. If US military and economic support for Japan is lessened, the capability of the Japanese Communist Party to seize control of the government will be correspondingly enhanced during the period of this estimate.

TOP SECRET

~~Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002100020005-0~~

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY
SOURCE		CIA CONTROL NO.
D/I USAF		75780
DOC. NO. NIE-64 Part I		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE 20 Nov. 52		25 Nov. 52
COPY NO. 5		LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES 3		AH
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS		
none		

[illegible]

~~Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0002100020005-0~~

**GPO**